The absence of a trusted c omputing base for mobile agents poses serious security issues for both the host system and the survivability of the agent. Once a mobile agent is dispatched, asserting anything about the host system, the agent's behavior, or even the agent's existence is di cult to ascertain. In order to employ agents with any degree of con dence, constraints need t o be placed on the agent computation since no restraints can be imposed (or assumed) about the host system's hardware or software. This paper presents a faulttolerant approach for increasing an agent owner's con dence i n the integrity of its agent.
INTRODUCTION
In traditional client-server settings, a central and trusted host communicates with statically bound client processes through either asynchronous messages or synchronous remote procedure calls. Mobile agents extend this communication paradigm by p r o viding a more exible approach for building distributed applications in an Internet-scale setting. A mobile agent is a program that is dispatched from a source computer and autonomously migrates to multiple hosts to perform the tasks (typically resource intensive computations) for which it was programmed.
The explosive growth of the Internet as a medium for communication, business, and electronic commerce has fostered the growing interest in agent-based systems. An agent's migratory behavior provides the ability to utilize an unbounded set of sources for information and computing resources. The salient c haracteristic of agent-based systems is the conservation of network bandwidth once the agent migrates to a host system, all subsequent computation is performed there. This approach is more e cient than moving the data to the computation and the overhead incurred by invoking remote operations.
Mobile agent computations can roughly be categorized into two domains: independent and dependent. The independent domain consists of mobile agents that are tasked with gathering data, usually from large databases. Computations are classi ed as independent when the result obtained from a host system does not depend on information retrieved from other hosts. This domain is typically associated with computations where the host systems are competitors, such as querying various airlines for ight information. The dependent domain includes computations where prior results obtained from host system(s) is required for subsequent computations at other host systems. Other research e orts include a third category commonly referred to as push technology, where agents provide host systems with information. An example is an agent that provides software upgrades to systems on the Internet. We will disregard the third category in this paper, because the permissions granted to the agents to accomplish such tasks pose an intolerable security threat to the host systems. Though there are other types of agent-based computations, the rst two categories represent the typical strategies for employing agents.
The exibility of agent-based computing is not without penalty since the value-added by employing agents is defeated if: (1) malicious or errant hosts attack agents, (2) malicious or errant agents attack hosts, or (3) erratic Internet behaviors or resource scarcity poseintolerable time delays. 1 Others have addressed mechanisms for protecting host systems from the vulnerabilities of non-local code 6, 17, 19, 22] . Although protecting systems from mobile code is not a solved problem, sandboxing techniques and access control have beenmostly successful for constraining non-local code. Of the three problems, the third problem is deemed as the hardest security problem with low solubility 7 ] . This problem is considered most di cult primarily because it is impossible to prevent malicious or faulty sites from tampering with cleartext agents 2], nor is it possible for a cleartext agent to maintain code or data privacy.
Recent research in mobile computing security contradicts the previous statement by presenting a protocol that allows certain mobile code programs (ones that compute polynomial or rational functions) to execute in encrypted form except for the cleartext instructions 15]. Therefore, execution on a host system does not compromise an agent's privacy and it safeguards against agent tampering (because host systems cannot decrypt the agents). Although this approach is critical for protecting mobile agents (tasked with computations in this particular set of functions), we assume cleartext agents in order to encompass all agent computations.
Our focus is on the rst problem: malicious or faulty hosts. This paper presents a method for decreasing the vulnerability of cleartext agents to malicious or faulty host systems. In addition to the malicious host system threats, agents systems are burdened with the problem that the behavior of an agent on each host system is unknown. That is, an agent will execute in many environments that may have not been anticipated or tested before dispatching the agent. After all, the host system may simply su er from faulty software or hardware, and we cannot anticipate what problems an agent m a y su er from due to these non-malicious problems. In spite of these problems, the e ciency and exibility of mobile agents has lured many to use this paradigm. But before the agent paradigm is applied to critical applications, assurance regarding the inherent security issues of mobile agents is needed.
This paper proposes a fault-tolerant approach that: (1) makes mobile agents more resilient to the possibility that host systems may attempt to tamper with agents, and (2) masks the e ects of agent incompatibilities with host systems. Our approach assumes that we h a ve complete control of the agent before it leaves our site, but after that, we h a ve no control of the agent. We h a ve designed an approach b y w h i c h an agent c a n m o ve from host to host and perform the tasks that any other agent can perform, while increasing our con dence in the integrity of the results from our agent. We expect that an agent will at some point accidentally visit a malicious or faulty host. Our approach presumes this likelihood and provides defensive steps that can attempt to overcome any damage.
AGENT INSECURITIES
As a simple example of the types of concerns we are worried about, suppose an agent is dispatched from an agent o wner, O, t o m ultiple host systems. After the agent l e a ves, how does O know its agent is alive \in the desired way"? Certainly, i f O receive s a s i m p l e \ i a m alive" message from the agent, then the alive portion of the question can beaddressed. But assuring O that the agent is alive in the desired manner is not easily answered. To answer this, we need to know whether the agent is performing the computation x that it is supposed to (as opposed to performing some other computation y that it should not be). If the agent is performing computation y, that suggests that the host system may have maliciously tampered with the agent's behavior. However, performing computation y also suggests another possibility: a host has inadvertently tampered with the agent d u e to some unexpected incompatibility, such as a glitch in the host's software or hardware system. Either situation will likely force the agent to exhibit unintended behaviors, thus increasing the possibility t h a t the agent will return incorrect results to the owner. From the standpoint of O, both situations are undesirable and equally di cult to detect.
If an agent were to return incorrect information, we must rst beable to detect that the information is incorrect. Secondly, it would be bene cial to be able to determine which situation caused the problem: a faulty host or malicious host. Since determining this will often be too costly or impossible, the best that we can do is to build enough robustness into how a g e n ts return information to the agent o wner such that the possibility of detecting either occurrence is increased.
One idea that appears to partially address the faulty or malicious host problem has already been proposed. Vigna has proposed cryptographic traces of the computations performed by agents 18]. These traces shadow the execution of an agent in a manner that cannot be forged by the host. Although, this information provides insight into an agent's status, manual veri cation of the \huge" (\even if compressed" 18]) statement traces is an expensive process, which is likely to be ine cient and error-prone. This conjecture is reinforced by others 1]: \The trouble with traces is that they give us far more information than we need. In fact, the typical trace program provides so much information that con rming the path from its massive output dump is more work than simulating the computer by hand to con rm the path." An alternative solution to increase the likelihood that agents are executing in the desired way is to build fault-tolerant schemes into agent-based systems. We are not the rst to propose using the principles of fault-tolerant computing with mobile agents and will summarize some of the ideas put forth by others. But before doing so, we will rst give an example of what it means to build fault tolerance into an agent-based system. Figure 1 depicts a simple agent computation, where an agent is dispatched from the agent owner O, migrates to n networked host computers and returns back to O. For simplicity, we will assume that the source and nal destination of the agent are the same. If a mobile agent is corrupted while traveling from host to host, the corruption will almost certainly propagate to each successor site including the nal destination site. Thus this issue can be modeled as a \propagation problem," and there is a wealth of existing solutions from other domains that allow us to study how corrupted information propagates (e.g., static fault tree analysis, failure mode e ect and criticality analysis 11], slicing 20], data ow analysis 14], etc.). We will leverage the basic principles of halting the propagation of corrupt information in agent-based systems by proposing a \design-for-fault-tolerance" approach to thwart the e ects of agent corruption.
The IEEE de nes fault tolerance as 8]: \(1) the ability of a system or component t o c o n tinue normal operation despite the presence of hardware or software fault. (2) the number of faults a system or component can withstand before normal operation is impaired. (3) pertaining to the study of errors, faults, and failures, and methods for enabling systems to continue normal operation in the presence of fault." Traditionally, fault tolerance has been achieved by building subsystems from redundant components that are placed in parallel to ensure higher quality 13]. Due to the improvement in hardware fault tolerance, the use of redundant components was extended into the software domain. For example, in an n-version system, two or more independently created yet functionally equivalent programs are developed from the same speci cation. A voter collects the outputs generated from executing the n versions in parallel, and selects the output of the fault-tolerant system according to a pre-speci ed algorithm. The general intuition is that the output value that is most frequently observed must bethe correct result this is of course not always true 10].
Schneider 16] presents a fault-tolerant approach to mask the e ects of faulty processors by replicating the agent at each visited site. More speci cally, the agent visits multiple host systems at a site and each host system sends the agent's output to every host system in the subsequent site where voting will occur to mask the e ects of faulty processors. This approach also uses digital signature traces to allow the voter to verify the authenticity o f its electorate.
Although this approach is fairly successful in coupling fault tolerance and agents, there are a couple drawbacks. If any processor involved in the fault-tolerant agent computation is down or refuses to allow t h e a g e n t to execute, this fault-tolerant agent computation can easily degrade to the agent computation illustrated in Figure 1 unbeknownst to the agent owner. To prevent this from occurring, voters could beforced to delay voting until each member of the electorate submitted its results. In this situation, however, a processor that is either down or refuses the agent w ould cause the entire agent computation to never terminate. Either situation is equally undesirable since the goal is to build fault tolerance into agents. A second drawback is that whenever this fault-tolerant scheme successfully masks a faulty processor, the agent owner has no record of which host was malicious or faulty. This information is quite useful for subsequent agent computations.
Another fault-tolerant approach has been proposed which dispatches two identical agents to a known set of host systems, where one traverses the systems in one direction and the other agent does the reverse 21]. So for example if you order the hosts, h 1 h 2 : : : h n , then one agent w ould traverse forward from h 1 to h n , and the other agent w ould start at h n and work backward. The author of this approach acknowledged that this approach is only successful in detecting at most one malicious system. Furthermore, this approach cannot determine which host in fh 1 h 2 : : : h n g is malicious to eliminate that host site for subsequent agent computations.
Some might also suggest a similar approach where multiple identical agents are released and try all sorts of host traversal combinations in order to increase the probability that at least one non-tampered agent will survive. We can conceive situations where this \shotgun" approach w ould work, but we also can see it ooding the Internet to the point of gridlock.
Our solution is based on the principles of fault tolerance but without any independence assumptions. Our protocol requires a limited degree of interaction between the agent owner (or another designated, trusted machine that will remain on-line) and its agent. 2 An interactive protocol between an owner and its mobile agents requires active participation from both an agent owner and an agent, precluding the possibility of the owner going o -line. This is the trade-o that we incur in order to increase the fault tolerance of agentbased systems. The interaction involved, however, must not be equated with agent taskdelegation. Further, the communication overhead does not even come close to negating the advantage of employing agents to conserve n e t work bandwidth to perform a typically resource intensive task with local resources/data on a host system. Rather, this interaction is merely to allow the voting portion of our fault-tolerant s c heme to execute on a trusted system, which for more critical agent applications is necessary.
Similar to the fears of using Commercial-O -The-Shelf (COTS) components, knowing a priori how an agent will congeal with a given host would require omnipotence. With agents, the state of the host systems that they will traverse is a black box to the agent owner. It is not possible to ever know exactly how an agent (the software) will behave on a host system without full access to the hardware and software of the host system. Therefore, applying defensive fault-tolerant strategies to agents with a limited degree of interaction with agent owners is all that we have to work with, since we cannot alter the behavior of the hosts (unless we wish to develop malicious agents, which of course we do not).
TOWARDS AGENT FAULT TOLERANCE
In our approach, we assume that all agent o wners and host system owners (these are likely to be the principals responsible for launching the agent server process on the host system) own a public and secret key. Further, we assume that migrating agents are encrypted using a public key system similar to PGP 4] . As in PGP, a random session key is generated for each agent. Using the private key algorithm, IDEA, the agent is encrypted with the random session key. Then, the RSA algorithm is used to encrypt the random session key with the recipient's public key. Both the encrypted agent and the encrypted session key are dispatched from each migration point of the agent. In order to transmit data from a host system back to an agent owner, the data is encrypted using the random session key that the agent carries. Next, the random session key is encrypted (by the host system) with the host system's secret key. The agent o wner can then decrypt the encrypted random session key with the host system's public key, and then use the random session key to decrypt the data received. Thus, combining PGP with agents allows us to: (1) securely transport agents, and (2) return computational results from each host system. This approach assumes that the keys for each host system and the agent owner have not been compromised.
By adding fault tolerance to agent systems, the problems created by malicious systems can bedecreased and assurance that the agent is compatible with a host system can be increased. This is quite di erent from the simple \ re-and-forget" methodology.
Similar to the aforementioned IEEE de nition for fault tolerance, software fault tolerance refers to the ability of the software to produce \acceptable" outputs (as de ned in the system-wide requirements) regardless of the program states that are encountered during execution. In the context of agents, our goal is to mask agent/host incompatibilities and mask errors resulting from defective or malicious hosts. To satisfy this goal, we will employ the ideas of redundancy and voting.
We will now discuss our scheme for applying redundancy and voting to improve the validity of the results from agents. Our approach deliberately dispatches an agent to visit multiple host systems within a single domain whenever enough information exists to do so. systems. As you will see, this (combined with voting) boosts the fault tolerance of mobile agents. Figure 2 illustrates our redundant agent architecture. Each column in the gure corresponds to a domain containing multiple host systems that are visited by the agent. Here, O is the agent owner, and Domain 1, Domain 2, Domain 3, and Domain 4 are the respective domains that are traversed by the agent. In this gure, our agent will traverse four di erent domains, for a total of 14 host machines. The solid lines in the gure designate the path of the agent, and the bidirectional dashed lines represent the transmission of the encrypted results computed from executing the agent on one of host platforms and an agent owner response.
We will now walk through this example of a fault-tolerant agent system. It is the role of the agent owner to dispatch the encrypted agent and random session key (as we previously described) to the three host systems in Domain 1, namely 1, 2 and 3. Each of these host systems decrypt the random session key using its own (the host system's) secret key. With the random session key, each host system can now decrypt and execute the agent. Upon completion, each host system sends the encrypted results (not the agent) and random session key back t o t h e a g e n t o wner. For now, let's assume every host system returns these results punctually.
After the results are obtained from each of the host systems within a domain, the agent o wner votes on the outputs received and selects an output for this domain based on a pre-speci ed voting algorithm. Then, the agent owner generates a n e w random session key and sends the key to the host system that had the \correct" output. If more than one host system provides the \correct" output to the agent o wner, then one of these host systems can be selected at random. In Domain 1, host system 1 had the \correct" output and therefore received a new random session key. In Figure 2 , note that the \selected" hosts correspond to the shaded host circles. Next, the selected host system dispatches the agent with the new random session key to each of the host systems in the succeeding domain.
In Figure 2 , the unshaded host systems in each domain are noti ed by the agent o wner to terminate the agent. It is possible that the agent does not get terminated, and in fact it might get dispatched to additional other host systems. However, if any host system attempts to return information back to the agent owner, the owner will detect that the wrong random session key (an out-dated key) is in-use and will discard any results that are not encrypted with the correct random session key.
Because voting takes place on a trusted system, assurance in the output for each domain is increased. 4 By passing intermediate results back to the agent o wner, the owner now has insight into which host systems could be faulty or malicious and can dispatch future agent computations accordingly.
This idea of voting on a trusted base has been championed by others. Farmer et al. 3] stated that as one achievable security requirement of mobile agents, any critical decisions should bemade on a trusted system. Since correct execution of instructions cannot be guaranteed 5], voting on an a untrusted host system is not prudent. Further, voting is typically a simple computation. Thus, we contend that the voting algorithm is likely to bethe easiest and most appealing portion of the agent to tamper with.
Di erent voting algorithms exist 9]. Typically, voting algorithms pick the output value that is most commonly observed. This is referred to as \majority v oting." If there is not a majority agreement, one output may be selected at random, maximum agreement may bechosen, or a median result may becomputed based on the outputs received 12]. Using a majority voting scheme, unless a majority of the host systems within a domain collude to blatantly lie or tamper with the visiting agent in exactly the same way, this approach can mask the e ects of up to dn=2e;1 f a u l t y host systems where n is the number of host systems in a domain. For agents, the voting algorithm employed may depend, in part, on the type of information that the agent has collected, the agent's computation, and the numberof host systems within a domain. 5 As an example of how voting depends on the agent's task and current situation, suppose an agent can only visit two host systems within a domain. Further suppose the agent is tasked with nding the cost of a ight from point A to point B, and the result of the second system is di erent t h a n the rst. Since there is a discrepancy in this type of agent task, the cheaper price may b e favored. Such discrepancies can occursince database query results may change frequently. However, if the agent's task was purely computational with identical inputs on both host systems and a discrepancy resulted, selecting an output may not be as trivial. In this situation, this may indicate that the agent should repeat the computation to settle on one result, or that the agent should migrate to host systems with equivalent resource availability in another domain to repeat the computation. How to handle these and other similar discrepancies may di er for each agent. Determining how to handle these situations aids in selecting which voting algorithm is best suited for the agent computation.
As we alluded to in the previous example, this voting scheme can be used for shopping agents. Certainly, dispatching multiple agents to make the same purchase is not the intent. Rather, voting can be employed to notify which agent should make t h e purchase. It is possible that each a g e n t will get a di erent price from a host system even if the hosts operate properly. This is because the agents may execute at slightly di erent times/rates, thus getting di erent inputs and results as the world changes.
In summary, w e h a ve a c hieved a higher degree of agent fault tolerance by programming the agent to visit multiple host systems within the same domain. The rationale for doing so follows: di erent les, environment v ariables, permissions, and software and hardware con gurations can cause each host system to beunique even when they are in the same domain. Software is a dynamic, behavioral entity, whose behavior is partially determined by the software's inputs as well as the immediate state of the execution environment. Since the very nature of agents is to traverse multiple systems (which means traversing multiple environments), the exact behavior of an agent in each di erent environment cannot beknown until the exact time at which the agent is in each environment.
By tracking intermediate results, an owner can better determine the legitimacy of its agents for both dependent and independent computations. This also allows agent o wners a means to better determine (and meet) real time constraints for agent computations. That is, if an agent is tied up due to resource de cient host systems or if an agent was terminated at some point, an agent o wner can learn (or deduce) this by receiving (or lack of) these intermediate results and dispatch other agents accordingly. Otherwise, the agent owner has little, if any, information about the status of its agents.
SUMMARY
Admittedly, there are a couple drawbacks to our approach. First, the agent owner or another trusted system must remain connected to the network while the agent is still active since communication is continual during the agent's migration. Thus, this approach w ould not be useful for those who need to remain o -line and have no access to other machines that will remain on-line. Second, the communication overhead to send information back to the agent owner will delay the agent's computation. This will increase the duration of the agent's overall computation, especially when the voter is waiting to receive results from other systems.
As we previously mentioned, however, the voter (agent o wner) need not wait for all of the results. For instance, with a majority v oting scheme, a voter need only wait until it has received a majority of identical results. Thus, voters can tolerate slowdowns in returning results or even situations where agents have been terminated by a host system. In spite of these drawbacks, we remain rm in our belief that when integrity i s imperative, it is better to incur the additional costs of returning information to the agent owner and letting it perform the voting than risking voter corruption by host systems. Furthermore, arming an agent o wner with intermediate results is critical in determining the trustworthiness of an agent's nal results. This paper has addressed the problem of agents visiting anomalous host systems.
